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Abstract. In the paper, we present some modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index defined in a
social network in which players may influence each other. Due to influences of the other actors,
the final decision of a player may be different from his original inclination. These modifications
are defined for an arbitrary probability distribution over all inclination vectors. In particular, they
concern a situation in which the inclination vectors may be not equally probable. Furthermore, by
assuming special probability distributions over all inclination vectors, we construct modifications
of the Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index and with the Holler-Packel
index, respectively.
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1 Introduction
The point of departure for this paper is the concept of decisional power (Hoede and Bakker
1982), called also the Hoede-Bakker index. This concept is defined for calculating power
in a social network, in which players make an acceptance-rejection decision, and they may
influence each other when making such a decision. One of the main notions is the concept
of an inclination vector which indicates the inclinations of all players to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In
Hoede and Bakker (1982) it is assumed that all inclination vectors are equally probable.
In Rusinowska and De Swart (2007), some properties of the Hoede-Bakker index have
been analyzed, with a focus on the postulates for power indices and the voting power
paradoxes displayed by this index. In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), the authors
generalize the Hoede-Bakker index, by removing one of the originally assumed axioms.
This generalization happens to coincide with the absolute Banzhaf index (Banzhaf 1965).
Moreover, some modifications of the decisional power index that coincide respectively with
the Rae index (Rae 1969), the Coleman indices (Coleman 1971, 1986), and the Ko¨nig-
Bra¨uninger index (Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998), are proposed in Rusinowska and De
Swart (2006). These modifications are defined under the assumption that all inclination
vectors are equally probable.
The aim of this paper is to introduce and analyze indices, based on the Hoede-Bakker
set-up, that would measure power in a social network in which inclination vectors do
not have to be equally probable. First, we propose some modifications of the Hoede-
Bakker index for an arbitrary probability distribution over all inclination vectors. Next,
by choosing ‘proper’ probability distributions over all inclination vectors, we define ‘a la
Shapley-Shubik’ and ‘a la Holler-Packel’ indices for a social network, that is, modifications
of the decisional power index that coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and
Shubik 1954) and modifications that coincide with the Holler-Packel index (Holler 1982,
Holler and Packel 1983).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 concerns a probabilistic approach to power
indices. In Section 3, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index is recapitulated. In Section 4,
we propose several modifications of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index for an arbitrary
probability distribution over the inclination vectors. Next, we choose the probability dis-
tributions under which the modifications defined become an ‘a la Shapley-Shubik index’
and an ‘a la Holler-Packel index’ for a social network. In Section 5, we present modifica-
tions of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index.
Section 6 concerns a modification coinciding with the Holler-Packel index. In Section 7,
an example illustrating the concepts introduced is presented. In Section 8, we conclude.
2 Probabilistic approach to power indices
There are basically two approaches to power indices: the axiomatic approach and the
probabilistic one. In this research, we apply the probabilistic model for measuring ‘de-
cisiveness’ in voting situations presented in Laruelle and Valenciano (2005). Below, we
present the main concepts of this model.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of voters who have to vote (‘yes’ with abstention
included or ‘no’) on a submitted proposal. A vote configuration S is the result of voting
in which all voters in S vote ‘yes’, and all voters in N \ S vote ‘no’. Hence, k ∈ S means
that voter k votes ‘yes’. A winning configuration is a vote configuration leading to the
passage of the proposal in question. Let W be the set of winning configurations. The pair
(N,W ) is called an N -voting rule. The following conditions are imposed: (i) N ∈ W ;
(ii) ∅ /∈ W ; (iii) If S ∈ W , then T ∈ W for any T containing S; (iv) If S ∈ W , then
N \ S /∈ W . 1
A probability distribution over all possible vote configurations is assumed. It is rep-
resented by a map p : 2N → [0, 1], associating with each vote configuration S ⊆ N its
probability 0 ≤ p(S) ≤ 1 to occur, where∑S⊆N p(S) = 1. That is, p(S) is the probability
that all voters in S vote ‘yes’, and all voters in N \ S vote ‘no’.
Let (W, p) be an N -voting situation, where W is the voting rule to be used and p is
the probability distribution over vote configurations, and let k ∈ N . Then:
Φk(W, p) := Prob(k is decisive) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈W
S \ {k} /∈W
p(S) +
∑
S : k /∈ S /∈W
S ∪ {k} ∈W
p(S) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈W
S \ {k} /∈W
(p(S) + p(S \ {k})) (1)
Φ+k (W, p) := Prob(k is decisive | k votes ‘yes′) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈W
S \ {k} /∈W
p(S)∑
S:k∈S p(S)
(2)
1 This condition is not necessary in this model.
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Φ−k (W, p) := Prob(k is decisive | k votes ‘no′) =
∑
S : k /∈ S /∈W
S ∪ {k} ∈W
p(S)∑
S:k/∈S p(S)
(3)
3 The generalized decisional power index
The concept of decisional power or the Hoede-Bakker index (Hoede and Bakker 1982)
has been generalized in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006). In this section, we recapitulate
the definition of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index. We consider a social network in
which n ≥ 2 players (actors, voters) have to make an acceptance-rejection decision. Let
N = {1, ..., n} be the set of all players. Each actor has an inclination either to say ‘yes’
(denoted by 1) or ‘no’ (denoted by 0). Let i be an inclination vector (i.e., an n-vector
consisting of ones and zeros and indicating the inclinations of the actors), and let I
denote the set of all inclination vectors. Of course, |I| = 2n. In the social network, players
may influence each other. Due to influences of the other actors, the final decision of a
player may be different from his original inclination. Each inclination vector i ∈ I is
then transformed into a decision vector b which is also an n-vector consisting of ones
and zeros and indicating the decisions made by all players. Formally, there is an operator
B : I → B(I), that is, b = Bi, where B(I) denotes the set of all decision vectors. We
also introduce the group decision gd : B(I) → {+1,−1} which is a function defined on
the decision vectors b, having the value +1 if the group decision is ‘yes’, and the value
−1 if the group decision is ‘no’.
We introduce the following notation. Let
i ≤ i′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | ik = 1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | i′k = 1}, (4)
and
i < i′ ⇐⇒ [i ≤ i′ ∧ i 6= i′]. (5)
Moreover, let i∅ = (0, ..., 0) denote an inclination vector with negative inclinations of all
voters, and let iN = (1, ..., 1) denote an inclination vector with positive inclinations of all
voters.
Let gd(B) be the composition of B and gd. In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), the
following three conditions are imposed:
∀i ∈ I ∀i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ gd(Bi) ≤ gd(Bi′)] (6)
gd(BiN) = +1 (7)
gd(Bi∅) = −1, (8)
and the following definition is introduced. Given gd(B), the generalized Hoede-Bakker
index or the generalized decisional power index of player k ∈ N is given by
GHBk(gd(B)) =
1
2n
· (
∑
{i: ik=1}
gd(Bi)−
∑
{i: ik=0}
gd(Bi)). (9)
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The generalized Hoede-Bakker index is a measure of Success − Failure (Rusinowska
2008), and this index measures Decisiveness (that is, it coincides with the absolute
Banzhaf index) if all inclination vectors are equally probable (Rusinowska and De Swart
2006).
4 Modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index for an arbitrary
probability distribution
In modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index proposed in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006),
all inclination vectors are assumed to be equally probable, that is, the probability distri-
bution over all inclination vectors is the following:
p∗(i) :=
1
2n
for all i ∈ I. (10)
In this paper, we resign from assumption (10) and propose several modifications of the
generalized Hoede-Bakker index that are defined for an arbitrary probability distribution
p : I → [0, 1] over all inclination vectors.
Let k ∈ N and i = (i1, ..., in). By ik = (ik1, ..., ikn) we denote the inclination vector such
that
ikj =

ij if j 6= k
0 if j = k and ij = 1
1 if j = k and ij = 0
. (11)
Similar as in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), we introduce a bijection f : I → 2N
between inclination vectors and vote configurations, such that
∀i ∈ I [f(i) = {k ∈ N | ik = 1}]. (12)
Let for each i ∈ I
|i| := |f(i)| = |{k ∈ N | ik = 1}|. (13)
Moreover, given gd(B), we say that:
– vote configuration f(i) (equivalently, inclination vector i ∈ I) is winning (f(i) ∈ W )
iff gd(Bi) = +1;
– f(i) (equivalently, i ∈ I) is losing iff gd(Bi) = −1;
– f(i) (equivalently, i ∈ I) is minimal winning iff gd(Bi) = +1 and for each i′ < i,
gd(Bi′) = −1.
By Imw we denote the set of all minimal winning inclination vectors, that is,
Imw := {i ∈ I | gd(Bi) = +1 ∧ ∀i′ < i [gd(Bi′) = −1]}. (14)
|Imw| denotes the number of minimal winning inclination vectors.
We assume that the probability distribution p over all inclination vectors is the same
as the probability distribution over all corresponding vote configurations, that is,
∀i ∈ I [p(i) = p(f(i))], (15)
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and, consequently, ∑
i∈I
p(i) = 1, (16)
where 0 ≤ p(i) ≤ 1 denotes the probability that the inclination vector i occurs, and f is
defined in (12).
We impose conditions (6), (7), and (8), and introduce the following definition.
Definition 1 Given gd(B) and probability distribution p over all inclination vectors, for
each k ∈ N :
Γk(gd(B), p) =
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)−
∑
{i: ik=0}
p(i) · gd(Bi). (17)
Since gd(Bi) ∈ {−1,+1} for i ∈ I, we get, for each k ∈ N , Γk(gd(B), p) ≤ 1. Unfor-
tunately, for an arbitrary p, Γk(gd(B), p) is not a power index measuring decisiveness of
player k any more, where decisiveness of k means that by changing his inclination, k also
changes the group decision. In particular, Γk(gd(B), p) may be even negative. Of course,
by assuming some (sometimes artificial) conditions, we get Γk(gd(B), p) ≥ 0 for k ∈ N .
One may, for instance, impose a kind of ‘generalized’ version of (6), that is,
∀i ∈ I ∀i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ p(i) · gd(Bi) ≤ p(i′) · gd(Bi′)], (18)
and then get Γk(gd(B), p) ≥ 0 for each k ∈ N . Condition (18) means, in particular, that
for two winning (loosing, respectively) inclination vectors i, i′ such that i ≤ i′, we have
p(i) ≤ p(i′) (p(i) ≥ p(i′), respectively). This could suggest that the probability of voters’
inclinations depends on the final results of voting.
The question arises when Γk(gd(B), p) is equal to the probability that voter k is
decisive. Given relation between W and gd(B), that is,
S = f(i) ∈ W ⇔ gd(Bi) = +1, (19)
we have
Proposition 1 Given gd(B), W and p, for each k ∈ N
Γk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W, p) ⇔
∑
{i: ik=1}
(p(i)− p(ik)) · (gd(Bi) + gd(Bik)) = 0. (20)
Proof. By virtue of (12) and (15), we have S = f(i) and p(S) = p(i) for each i ∈ I.
Moreover, k ∈ S iff ik = 1; k /∈ S iff ik = 0; S ∈ W iff gd(Bi) = +1, S /∈ W iff
gd(Bi) = −1. Hence,
(k ∈ S ∈ W and S \ {k} /∈ W ) iff (ik = 1 and gd(Bi) = +1 and gd(Bik) = −1)
(k /∈ S /∈ W and S ∪ {k} ∈ W ) iff (ik = 0 and gd(Bi) = −1 and gd(Bik) = +1)
By virtue of (1), we have then
Φk(W, p) =
∑
i : ik = 1
gd(Bi) = +1
gd(Bik) = −1
p(i) +
∑
i : ik = 0
gd(Bi) = −1
gd(Bik) = +1
p(i)
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and therefore, since (6) is imposed,
Φk(W, p) =
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)− gd(Bi
k)
2
+
∑
{i: ik=0}
p(i) · gd(Bi
k)− gd(Bi)
2
. (21)
Hence,
Γk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W, p) ⇔
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)+
+
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bik)−
∑
{i: ik=0}
p(i) · gd(Bi)−
∑
{i: ik=0}
p(i) · gd(Bik) = 0 ⇔
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · (gd(Bi) + gd(Bik))−
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(ik) · (gd(Bik) + gd(Bi)) = 0 ⇔
∑
{i: ik=1}
(p(i)− p(ik)) · (gd(Bi) + gd(Bik)) = 0.

Note that, in particular, if all inclination vectors are equally probable, that is, the prob-
ability distribution satisfies condition (10), then Γk(gd(B), p) does measure decisiveness
of voter k. This is, of course, consistent with the result proved in Rusinowska and De
Swart (2006) that the generalized Hoede-Bakker index GHBk(gd(B)) recapitulated in
(9) is equal to the probability that player k is decisive.
As before, we impose conditions (6), (7), and (8), and introduce the following nota-
tions.
Definition 2 Given gd(B) and probability distribution p over all inclination vectors, for
each k ∈ N :
Ψk(gd(B), p) =
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) + p(ik)
2
· (gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)) (22)
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) =
∑
{i: ik=1} p(i) · (gd(Bi)− gd(Bik))
2
∑
{i: ik=1} p(i)
(23)
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) =
∑
{i: ik=0} p(i) · (gd(Bik)− gd(Bi))
2
∑
{i: ik=0} p(i)
. (24)
Of course, since gd(Bi) ∈ {−1,+1} for i ∈ I, and by virtue of (6), we have for each gd(B),
p, and k ∈ N , 0 ≤ Ψk(gd(B), p) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ψ+k (gd(B), p) ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ Ψ−k (gd(B), p) ≤ 1.
Moreover, given (19), we have
Proposition 2 Given gd(B), W and p, for each k ∈ N
Ψk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W, p) (25)
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Φ
+
k (W, p) (26)
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Φ
−
k (W, p). (27)
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Proof. By virtue of (22) and (21), we have
Ψk(gd(B), p) =
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) + p(ik)
2
· (gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)) =
=
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)− gd(Bi
k)
2
+
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(ik) · gd(Bi)− gd(Bi
k)
2
=
=
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)− gd(Bi
k)
2
+
∑
{i: ik=0}
p(i) · gd(Bi
k)− gd(Bi)
2
= Φk(W, p).
As stated in the proof of Proposition 1, ik = 1 iff k ∈ S. Moreover,
(ik = 1 and gd(Bi) = +1 and gd(Bi
k) = −1) iff (k ∈ S ∈ W and S \ {k} /∈ W ).
Hence, by virtue of (23) and (2),
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = (
∑
{i: ik=1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)− gd(Bi
k)
2
) · 1∑
{i: ik=1} p(i)
=
=
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈W
S \ {k} /∈W
p(S)∑
S:k∈S p(S)
= Φ+k (W, p).
By analogy, ik = 0 iff k /∈ S. Moreover,
(ik = 0 and gd(Bi) = −1 and gd(Bik) = +1) iff (k /∈ S /∈ W and S ∪ {k} ∈ W ).
Hence, by virtue of (24) and (3),
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = (
∑
{i: ik=0}
p(i) · gd(Bi
k)− gd(Bi)
2
) · 1∑
{i: ik=0} p(i)
=
=
∑
S : k /∈ S /∈W
S ∪ {k} ∈ W
p(S)∑
S:k/∈S p(S)
= Φ−k (W, p).

5 Modifications leading to the Shapley-Shubik index
One of the most well-known power indices presented in the literature on voting power
is the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954). Using notations from Section 2,
this index is defined as follows. For a given voting rule W , the Shapley-Shubik index, for
each k ∈ N , is given by
Shk(W ) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈W
S \ {k} /∈W
(n− |S|)! · (|S| − 1)!
n!
, (28)
where |S| denotes the number of voters with vote ‘yes’.
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We would like to extend work done in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), in which
modifications of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Rae index, the
Coleman indices, and the Ko¨nig-Bra¨uninger index are presented. The question appears
whether by choosing ‘proper’ probability distributions over all inclination vectors, our
modifications of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index may coincide with the Shapley-
Shubik index.
Let for x ∈ N
Even(x, x+ 1) =
{
x if x is even
x+ 1 if x is odd
(29)
and
Odd(x, x+ 1) =
{
x if x is odd
x+ 1 if x is even
. (30)
Given (19), we have
Proposition 3 Ψk(gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if and only if
1
n+ 1
· (1− 1( n
Even([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
)) ≤ p(i∅) ≤ 1
n+ 1
· ( 1( n
Odd([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
) + 1), (31)
and
p(i) =

1
n+1
· ( 1
(n|i|)
− 1) + p(i∅) if |i| is even
1
n+1
· ( 1
(n|i|)
+ 1)− p(i∅) if |i| is odd . (32)
In particular, Ψk(gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if for each i ∈ I
p(i) =
1
n+ 1
· 1(n
|i|
) . (33)
Proof. By virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), Shk(W ) = Φk(W, p) for all k and
W if
p(S) =
1
n+ 1
· 1( n
|S|
) for S ⊆ N. (34)
Hence, applying (25) and (15), and replacing in (34) vote configuration S by inclination
vector i, and |S| by |i| (see (13)), we have for each k ∈ N , Ψk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W, p) =
Shk(W ), where p is defined in (33).
Moreover, by virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), if p and p′ are two probability
distributions, then Φk(W, p) = Φk(W, p
′) for every k ∈ N and every voting rule W iff for
all S 6= ∅
p′(S) = p(S) + (−1)|S|+1 · (p(∅)− p′(∅)). (35)
Hence, Ψk(gd(B), p) = Ψk(gd(B), p
′) for every k ∈ N and gd(B) iff for each i 6= i∅
p′(i) = p(i) + (−1)|i|+1 · (p(i∅)− p′(i∅)). (36)
By combining (33) and (36), we get (32). Taking into account that 0 ≤ p(i) ≤ 1 for each
i ∈ I, and applying this to (32), we get, for each i ∈ I such that |i| is even,
0 ≤ 1
n+ 1
· (1− 1(n
|i|
)) ≤ p(i∅) ≤ 1− 1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) − 1),
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and for each i ∈ I such that |i| is odd,
1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) + 1)− 1 ≤ p(i∅) ≤ 1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) + 1) ≤ 1.
Note that for each i ∈ I,
1− 1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) − 1) ≥ 1,
and
1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) + 1)− 1 ≤ 0.
Hence,
max
|i|−even
1
n+ 1
· (1− 1(n
|i|
)) ≤ p(i∅) ≤ min
|i|−odd
1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) + 1),
and since
max
|i|−even
1
n+ 1
· (1− 1(n
|i|
)) = 1
n+ 1
· (1− 1( n
Even([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
))
and
min
|i|−odd
1
n+ 1
· ( 1(n
|i|
) + 1) = 1
n+ 1
· ( 1( n
Odd([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
) + 1),
we get (31). Let us write (32) equivalently as
p(i) =
1
n+ 1
· 1(n
|i|
) + (−1)|i|+1 · ( 1
n+ 1
− p(i∅))
for each i ∈ I. Note that, of course,∑
i∈I
p(i) =
∑
i∈I
[
1
n+ 1
· 1(n
|i|
) + (−1)|i|+1 · ( 1
n+ 1
− p(i∅))] =
1
n+ 1
·
∑
i∈I
1(
n
|i|
) + ( 1
n+ 1
− p(i∅)) ·
∑
i∈I
(−1)|i|+1 =
=
1
n+ 1
·
|i|=n∑
|i|=0
1(
n
|i|
) · (n|i|
)
+ (
1
n+ 1
− p(i∅)) ·
|i|=n∑
|i|=0
(−1)|i|+1 ·
(
n
|i|
)
= 1.

Proposition 4 Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W iff 0 ≤ p(i∅) < 1
and for any i 6= i∅
p(i) = (1− p(i∅)) ·
1
|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1(n
|i|
) . (37)
In particular, Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if p(i∅) = 0 and for any
i 6= i∅
p(i) =
1
|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1(n
|i|
) . (38)
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Proof. By virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), Shk(W ) = Φ
+
k (W, p) for all k and
W if p(∅) = 0 and
p(S) =
1
|S|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1( n
|S|
) for S 6= ∅. (39)
Hence, applying (26) and (15), and replacing S by i in (39), we get, for each k ∈ N ,
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Φ
+
k (W, p) = Shk(W ), where p is defined in (38).
Moreover, if p and p′ are two probability distributions, then (Laruelle and Valenciano
2005) Φ+k (W, p) = Φ
+
k (W, p
′) for every k ∈ N and every voting rule W iff for all S 6= ∅
p(S)
1− p(∅) =
p′(S)
1− p′(∅) , (40)
where p(∅), p′(∅) < 1. Hence, we get (37). Note that, of course,
∑
i∈I
p(i) = p(i∅) +
∑
i∈I\{i∅}
p(i) = p(i∅) + (1− p(i∅)) ·
∑
i∈I\{i∅}
1
|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1(n
|i|
) =
= p(i∅) +
1− p(i∅)∑n
t=1
1
t
·
|i|=n∑
|i|=1
1
|i| ·
1(
n
|i|
) · (n|i|
)
= 1.

Proposition 5 Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W iff 0 ≤ p(iN) < 1
and for any i 6= iN
p(i) = (1− p(iN)) ·
1
n−|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1(n
|i|
) . (41)
In particular, Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if p(iN) = 0 and for any
i 6= iN
p(i) =
1
n−|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1(n
|i|
) . (42)
Proof. By virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), Shk(W ) = Φ
−
k (W, p) for all k and
W if p(N) = 0 and
p(S) =
1
n−|S|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1( n
|S|
) for S 6= N. (43)
Hence, applying (27) and (15), and replacing S by i in (43), we get, for each k ∈ N ,
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Φ
−
k (W, p) = Shk(W ), where p is defined in (42).
Moreover, if p and p′ are two probability distributions, then (Laruelle and Valenciano
2005) Φ−k (W, p) = Φ
−
k (W, p
′) for every k ∈ N and every voting rule W iff for all S 6= ∅
p(S \ {k})
1− p(N) =
p′(S \ {k})
1− p′(N) ,
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where p(N), p′(N) < 1. Hence, we get (41). Moreover, note that,
∑
i∈I
p(i) = p(iN) +
∑
i∈I\{iN}
p(i) = p(iN) + (1− p(iN)) ·
∑
i∈I\{iN}
1
n−|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
· 1(n
|i|
) =
= p(iN) +
1− p(iN)∑n
t=1
1
t
·
|i|=n−1∑
|i|=0
1
n− |i| ·
1(
n
|i|
) · (n|i|
)
= 1.

6 Modification leading to the Holler-Packel index
Another power index analyzed in the literature is the Holler-Packel index (Holler 1982,
Holler and Packel 1983), an index referring to minimal winning configurations. A winning
configuration is minimal if it does not contain properly any other winning configuration.
The Holler-Packel index is based on the following assumptions: only minimal winning
configurations will be formed, all minimal winning configurations are equally probable,
all voters in a minimal winning coalition get the undivided coalition value.
Let M(W ) be the set of all minimal winning configurations. Let m(W ) and mk(W )
denote the number of minimal winning configurations and the number of minimal winning
configurations containing voter k ∈ N , respectively. For a given voting rule W , the non-
normalized Holler-Packel index, for each k ∈ N , is defined by
HPk(W ) =
mk(W )
m(W )
, (44)
and the Holler-Packel index, for each k ∈ N , is given by
H˜P k(W ) =
HPk(W )∑
j∈N HPj(W )
=
mk(W )∑
j∈N mj(W )
. (45)
One of our modifications of the generalized decisional power index coincides with the
non-normalized Holler-Packel index. We have
Proposition 6 Ψk(gd(B), p
mw) = HPk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W , where for each
i ∈ I
pmw(i) =
{ 1
|Imw| if i ∈ Imw
0 if i 6∈ Imw . (46)
Proof. We have: S = f(i) ∈ M(W ) iff i ∈ Imw. Applying a result from Laruelle and
Valenciano (2005) that HPk(W ) = Φk(W, pW ) for each k ∈ N and W , where
pW (S) =
{ 1
m(W )
if S ∈M(W )
0 if S 6∈M(W ) , (47)
and by virtue of (25), we have, for each k ∈ N , Ψk(gd(B), pmw) = Φk(W, pW ) = HPk(W ),
where pmw(i) is defined in (46). 
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7 Example
Let us consider a very simple example of a three-voter social network presented in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Three-voter social network
r1 r2
r 3@@@R    	
The set of voters is equal to N = {1, 2, 3}, and both voters 1 and 2 influence voter 3. If
voters 1 and 2 are unanimous with respect to their inclinations (that is, they have the
same inclination), voter 3 will follow the influence of voters 1 and 2. Otherwise, voter
3 will follow his own inclination. Moreover, suppose that the group decision is a simple
majority. We can write then:
b = (b1, b2, b3) =
{
(i1, i2, i1) if i1 = i2
(i1, i2, i3) if i1 6= i2 ,
and
∀i ∈ I [gd(Bi) = +1 ⇔ |{k ∈ N |bk = 1}| ≥ 2],
where Bi = b = (b1, b2, b3) denotes, of course, a decision vector.
Table 1 presents the group decision for our example.
Table 1: Group decision for Figure 1
inclination i Bi gd(Bi) inclination i Bi gd(Bi)
iN = (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) +1 i∅ = (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) −1
i(1) = (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1) +1 i(6) = (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0) −1
i(2) = (1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) +1 i(5) = (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) −1
i(3) = (0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1) +1 i(4) = (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) −1
Suppose now that we have a certain probability distribution p over all eight inclination
vectors. Using the notations from Section 4, we get the following:
Γ1(gd(B), p) = p(i
N) + p(i(1)) + p(i(2))− p(i(3))− p(i(4)) + p(i(5)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Γ2(gd(B), p) = p(i
N) + p(i(1))− p(i(2)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(4))− p(i(5)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Γ3(gd(B), p) = p(i
N)− p(i(1)) + p(i(2)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(5))− p(i(6)) + p(i∅).
Next, we like to check when modification Γk coincides with Φk, that is, when Γk measures
decisiveness of voter k ∈ N . By virtue of Proposition 1, we get

Γ1(gd(B), p) = Φ1(W, p)
Γ2(gd(B), p) = Φ2(W, p)
Γ3(gd(B), p) = Φ3(W, p)
⇔

p(iN)− p(i(3)) = p(i(4))− p(i∅)
p(iN)− p(i(2)) = p(i(5))− p(i∅)
p(iN)− p(i(1)) = p(i(6))− p(i∅)
⇔
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p(iN) + p(i∅) = p(i(3)) + p(i(4)) = p(i(2)) + p(i(5)) = p(i(1)) + p(i(6)) =
1
4
. (48)
For each probability distribution p which satisfies (48) we have
Γk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W, p) =
1
2
for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
One of the probability distributions satisfying (48) is, of course, p∗ defined by equation
(10).
We also have
Ψ1(gd(B), p) = p(i
(1)) + p(i(5)) + p(i(2)) + p(i(6))
Ψ2(gd(B), p) = p(i
(1)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(6))
Ψ3(gd(B), p) = p(i
(2)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(5))
For each probability distribution p which satisfies (48) we have, of course,
Ψk(gd(B), p) =
1
2
for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Next, we calculate when Ψk(gd(B), p) coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index Shk(W ).
By virtue of (31) and (32), we get Ψk(gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for each k = 1, 2, 3 iff
1
6
≤ p(i∅) ≤ 1
3
p(i) =

1
3
− p(i∅) for i ∈ {i(4), i(5), i(6)}
p(i∅)− 1
6
for i ∈ {i(1), i(2), i(3)}
1
2
− p(i∅) for i = iN
.
We have then
Ψk(gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) =
1
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
Moreover,
Ψ+1 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(1)) + p(i(2))
p(iN) + p(i(1)) + p(i(2)) + p(i(4))
Ψ+2 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(1)) + p(i(3))
p(iN) + p(i(1)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(5)))
Ψ+3 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(2)) + p(i(3))
p(iN) + p(i(2)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(6))
By virtue of Proposition 4, Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for k = 1, 2, 3 iff
0 ≤ p(i∅) < 1
p(i) =
{
2
11
· (1− p(i∅)) for i ∈ {i(4), i(5), i(6), iN}
1
11
· (1− p(i∅)) for i ∈ {i(1), i(2), i(3)} ,
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and then
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) =
1
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, we have
Ψ−1 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(5)) + p(i(6))
p(i(3)) + p(i(5)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Ψ−2 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(4)) + p(i(6))
p(i(2)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Ψ−3 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(4)) + p(i(5))
p(i(1)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(5)) + p(i∅)
.
By virtue of Proposition 5, Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) for k = 1, 2, 3 iff
0 ≤ p(iN) < 1
p(i) =
{
1
11
· (1− p(iN)) for i ∈ {i(4), i(5), i(6)}
2
11
· (1− p(iN)) for i ∈ {i∅, i(1), i(2), i(3)} .
Then we also have
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Shk(W ) =
1
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, we want to calculate when Ψk(gd(B), p) coincides with the non-normalized Holler-
Packel index. In our example
Imw = {i(1), i(2), i(3)},
and hence, by virtue of Proposition 6, we get Ψk(gd(B), p
mw) = HPk(W ) for k = 1, 2, 3,
where
pmw(i) =
{
1
3
if i ∈ {i(1), i(2), i(3)}
0 if i ∈ I \ {i(1), i(2), i(3)} .
Then, we get
Ψk(gd(B), p
mw) = HPk(W ) =
2
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider measures of power for a social network in which players have
either to accept or to reject a proposal. Each voter has an inclination either to say ‘yes’
or ‘no’, but he may also be influenced by other voter(s), and consequently his final de-
cision may be different from his (original) inclination. To the best of our knowledge,
the Hoede-Bakker index was analyzed so far only under the assumption of equally prob-
able inclination vectors. The main aim of this paper is to generalize the (generalized)
Hoede-Bakker index by considering arbitrary probability distributions over all inclina-
tion vectors. First, we define several modifications of the generalized decisional power
index for an arbitrary probability distribution. Next, by choosing ‘proper’ probability
distributions, we construct measures that coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index and
with the Holler-Packel index. Finally, in order to illustrate the notions introduced, we
consider a simple example.
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